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Critical Response
IV

Truth or Consequences:
On Being Against Theory
Steven Mailloux

Before reading "Against Theory" by Steven Knapp and Walter B

Michaels, I thought I fully understood Stanley Fish's theory of inte
pretive communities. Fish's theory seemed a consistent elaboration o
the claim that there are no uninterpreted givens. What we take to
independent facts are actually constructions of our interpretive assum
tions and strategies. From this perspective, texts do not determine in
pretations; interpretations constitute texts. Furthermore, interpret
practices are never idiosyncratic; that is, acts of making sense are alw
a function of shared beliefs or interpretive conventions. Every indiv

interpreter is a member of an interpretive community: "Since

thoughts an individual can think and the mental operations he can p
form have their source in some or other interpretive community, he
much a product of that community (acting as an extension of it) as
meanings it enables him to produce."' Such a grounding of interpret
tion in communities defends this hermeneutic theory against the cha
of relativism, the bugbear of the Anglo-American critical tradition s
the heyday of New Criticism. New Critics claimed to avoid interpre
relativism by grounding meaning objectively in the autonomous tex
Later, E. D. Hirsch tried to show that New Critical theory and pract
resulted in the very relativism the New Critics abhorred; Hirsch ar
that priority must be given to authorial intention in order to determ

valid or correct interpretations. Fish's theory of interpretive co

munities holds that interpretation produces both textual meaning a

1. Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Commun

(Cambridge, Mass., 1980), p. 14.
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authorial intention, but he avoids relativism by showing that there are
always correct interpretations, determined by communities rather than
individuals. Individual interpreters are not free to see or describe any
textual meaning they want-the fear of the New Critics-nor is meaning

made radically indeterminate-the complaint of Hirsch against the

anti-intentionalists. Rather, correct interpretations always exist and can

be (are already) determined. It's just that because interpretive com-

munities can change, so too can what counts as a correct interpretation.

So went my understanding of Fish's position before reading

"Against Theory." However, I now see that this previous understanding
was incomplete. To approach "Against Theory" and eventually reveal its
incompleteness, we can begin with a literary example of the two hermeneutic accounts that Knapp and Michaels reject on their way to rejecting theory in general.
In George Orwell's 1984 the Party maintains its absolute power over

the people of Oceania by completely controlling all individual acts of
interpretation. Through material and ideological coercion, the Party
imposes its way of making sense on its people and achieves "the persistence of a certain world-view and a certain way of life" which forms the
basis of its totalitarian rule.2 This hermeneutic imperialism guarantees
that the people will continue to be "without any impulse to rebel" because
they are "without the power of grasping that the world could be other
than it is" (p. 173). O'Brien, the spokesman for the Party, points out the
philosophical assumption underlying its successful politics of interpreta-

tion: "Reality is inside the skull. . . . Nothing exists except through
human consciousness" (p. 218). Since the Party controls interpretation, it
controls human consciousness and thus manipulates reality itself. One
would-be rebel, Winston Smith, tries to resist the Party by attacking its

hermeneutics. He champions common sense, autonomous facts, external reality, and the empirical method. Though elsewhere Orwell supports Smith's philosophical stance, in 1984 he allows O'Brien to win the
argument (both rhetorically and politically) during the final confrontation between Smith and the Party spokesman.3 O'Brien argues that "re2. George Orwell, 1984 (1949; New York, 1961), p. 173; all further references to this
work will be included in the text.

3. See Gerald Graff, "Politics, Language, Deconstruction, Lies, and the Reflexive
Fallacy: A Rejoinder to W. J. T. Mitchell," Salmagundi 47-48 (Winter-Spring 1980): 88-89.

Steven Mailloux, associate professor of English at the University of
Miami, is the author of Interpretive Conventions: The Reader in the Study of

American Fiction. He is currently at work on a book on the institutional
history of American literary criticism. His previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, "Stanley Fish's 'Interpreting the Variorum': Advance or Retreat?" appeared in the Autumn 1976 issue.
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ality exists in the human mind, and nowhere else. Not in the individual
mind,... only in the mind of the Party, which is collective and immortal.
Whatever the Party holds to be truth is truth. It is impossible to see
reality except by looking through the eyes of the Party" (p. 205). Smith is

not able to counter O'Brien's arguments, and ultimately the Party is
successful in achieving its goal: "We shall squeeze you empty, and then
we shall fill you with ourselves" (p. 211). Smith submits by internalizing
the Party's world view and adopting its hermeneutic theory.
It is inevitable that Smith must lose, not only because he confronts
the overwhelming power of the state but also because he presents such a
weak case for his hermeneutic position. As O'Brien points out, Smith

holds that "the nature of reality is self-evident" (p. 205). He fails to
understand that his commonsense "facts" are as much a product of

interpretation as are the Party's; and he clings to a naive realist ontology

and a simplistic commonsense epistemology that O'Brien demolishes

from his dominant political position, through a more sophisticated hermeneutic argument, a form of idealism he calls "collective solipsism" (p.
219).

Knapp and Michaels would find neither Smith's realism nor
O'Brien's idealism to be satisfactory as hermeneutic theories. They write
that "a realist thinks that theory allows us to stand outside our beliefs in a
neutral encounter with the objects of interpretation; an idealist thinks
that theory allows us to stand outside our beliefs in a neutral encounter

with our beliefs themselves" ("Against Theory," p. 739). A realist like
Smith is mistaken when he assumes that "the object exists independent
of beliefs" and that "knowledge requires that we shed our beliefs in a
disinterested quest for the object" (p. 740). An idealist like O'Brien
avoids this mistake when he implies that "we can never shed our beliefs,"
but he commits his own kind of error when he equates knowledge with
"recognizing the role beliefs play in constituting their objects" (p. 740).
This constitutive hermeneutics is a necessary corollary of both O'Brien's
collective solipsism and Fish's theory of interpretive communities.4 In
the same way that O'Brien claims that the Party's collective mind creates
reality, Fish argues that interpretive communities create what they claim

merely to be discovering or describing. Of course, O'Brien and Fish

perceive themselves as living within radically different arrangements of
hermeneutic power. O'Brien sees himself as the extension of an interpretive community (the Party) that completely dominates the world of

1984. Fish, on the other hand, claims that his world contains many
competing communities, each vying for interpretive hegemony for its set
of beliefs, values, and ideologies.
4. For discussions of constitutive hermeneutics, see my Interpretive Conventions: The
Reader in the Study of American Fiction (Ithaca, N.Y., 1982), pp. 192-207, and "Learning to
Read: Interpretation and Reader-Response Criticism," Studies in the Literary Imagination 12

(Spring 1979): 93-108.
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Despite such differences in their sociological accounts, O'Brien and
Fish end up in the same theoretical contradiction. During his debate with
Smith, O'Brien's epistemological idealism leads him to imply that a true
believer within the Party could somehow get outside the Party's belief

system into a neutral space from which to judge the Party's beliefs.
Knapp and Michaels argue that Fish makes a similar move when he
claims to have a theory of interpretation through which he distances

himself from his own interpretive assumptions. This theory allows him
to argue that previous literary critics' "assumptions were not inferior but
merely different" from his own.5 As Knapp and Michaels point out, Fish
is claiming here that "no beliefs are, in the long run, truer than others."
But "it is only from the standpoint of a theory about belief which is not

itself a belief that this truth can be seen" (p. 741). Since Fish himself
admits there is no such standpoint outside belief, he has clearly con-

tradicted himself. Theories like Fish's and O'Brien's which admit the

absolute primacy of belief in practice cannot turn around and claim
escape belief in theory.
Knapp and Michaels ultimately argue that all theories cannot avo
similar contradictions or incoherencies whenever theory attempts to
scribe critical practice. They demonstrate how typical theorists base
methodological prescriptions on the prior separation of entities tha

in fact logically inseparable (intention and meaning, language

speech acts, knowledge and true belief). Theorists make these false s
arations so that they can prescribe moving from one entity to the oth
arrive at meaning or truth. Thus, if theory is understood as an atte
to describe so that it can have prescriptive consequences, then it is

coherent and should be abandoned. Theory, properly understood
no consequences.

Knapp and Michaels' arguments are convincing as far as they g
Their attack on theory as theory (i.e., as it conceives itself) certai

showed me a contradiction in Fish's theory that I had previously failed

notice. However, the conclusion that Knapp and Michaels draw fr
their arguments-that theory is inconsequential and should theref
stop-does not necessarily follow. True, theory does not have con

sequences in the exact way it claims to have consequences. Neverthele
theory has results of a very precise kind, as I will now try to show.
The work of Edward Said demonstrates quite clearly that theory ca

have disruptive consequences both inside and outside the discipline
literary studies. In Orientalism and other writings Said assumes a con
stitutive hermeneutics as he examines Orientalism as "the enormously

systematic discipline by which European culture was able to mana
and even produce-the Orient politically, sociologically, militaril

ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the pos
5. Fish, Is There a Text?, p. 368.

764 For and Against Theory

Steven Mailloux

Enlightenment period."6 Through Orientalism Europe imposed a selfserving meaning in an apparently disinterested way. In effect, it created
an Orient that was ripe for domination. The imperialist West did exactly
what the Party in 1984 tries to do: determine reality by controlling interpretation. The Party is simply more self-conscious about its "hermeneutics of power."7
Said's project has been to reveal the ideological interests behind the
hermeneutic power of Western discourse about the Islamic Orient. But
Said further claims that all descriptions of the Orient (not just those by

European and American Orientalists) are perspectival constructions

rather than objective representations:
I do not mean to suggest that a "real" Islam exists somewhere out
there that the media, acting out of base motives, have perverted.
Not at all. For Muslims as for non-Muslims, Islam is an objective
and also a subjective faith, because people create that fact in their
faith, in their societies, histories, and traditions, or, in the case of
non-Muslim outsiders, because they must in a sense fix, personify,
stamp the identity of that which they feel confronts them collec-

tively or individually. This is to say that the media's Islam, the
Western scholar's Islam, the Western reporter's Islam, and the

Muslim's Islam are all acts of will and interpretation that take place
in history, and can only be dealt with in history as acts of will and
interpretation.8

Since Said also grounds these acts of hermeneutic will in "communities
of interpretation," his theory resembles the epistemological idealism of

O'Brien and Fish, who claim that shared beliefs (assumptions, values,
ideologies) constitute reality.9 Though these theories are at times vulnerable to the "beliefless neutrality" objection discussed above, much
more often they support assertions like Knapp and Michaels' that there
is no "condition of knowledge prior to and independent of belief" (p.

738). If Knapp and Michaels are correct that "no general account of

belief [similar to their own] can have practical consequences," then these

idealist epistemologies that posit the primacy of belief should also be
inconsequential (p. 740). But such accounts can and do have consequences. In the world of 1984, the theory of collective solipsism provides a philosophical base for totalitarian domination. In the realm of
American scholarship and politics, Said's theoretical assumptions guide
his practical analyses of Orientalism, and these analyses have had very
definite consequences as the debates within the New Republic, the New
6. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York, 1978), p. 3; emphasis added.
7. The term is Graff's in "Textual Leftism," Partisan Review 49 (1982):566.
8. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the

World (New York, 1981), p. 41. See also Orientalism, pp. 273 and 322.
9. Said, Covering Islam, p. 41.
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York Review of Books, History and Theory, and other journals testify. In-

deed, a recent Humanities Report article noted that "the position Said
represents [in Orientalism] has produced a set of semi-academic study
groups and has implications for government and foreign policy."'0
But how exactly can a hermeneutic theory that, according to Knapp

and Michaels, should have no consequences result in these rhetorical
and political effects? In Said's case, the reason is that when he reveals
Orientalist representations as based on interested belief rather than impersonal truth, objectivists read his demystifying project as (successfully

or unsuccessfully) undermining the validity of Orientalist inter-

pretations, and Orientalism's victims read this same project as providing
support for the objectivity of their own self-interpretations. These appropriations of Said's discourse can occur because a demonstration that
others' asserted truth is actually interested belief always counts as a cri-

tique of their assertions in the present arena of critical and political
discussion. In such an arena, to expose asserted truth as "mere" belief is
to have the effect of undermining that truth even though the debunker
elsewhere insists that all truth is perspectival belief. Even in an essay in

which Said foregrounds the perspective from which he makes his

analysis (e.g., in "Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims"), his discourse still has the rhetorical effect of proof or propaganda (depending
on whether the reader is convinced or not by his arguments)."
But political consequences are only the most far-reaching results of
theory. More limited but just as real are the effects of theoretical prescriptions within the discipline of literary studies. Even if it is granted
that all theories are based on logical mistakes (like separating intention
and meaning), theories still have consequences for critical practice. All
we need do is remember the effects of New Critical proscriptions against
the intentional and affective fallacies. The critics persuaded by these
theoretical prohibitions avoided extrinsic approaches and directed their
analyses to intrinsic elements in the literary text itself-image patterns,

symbolic structures, and so forth. More recently, theories of un-

decidability have changed the interpretive practices of many within the
discipline: instead of looking for unities, they look for disunities, contradictions, incoherencies. Theory does change practice.
Here we finally reach the limits of Knapp and Michaels' account of
theory. Their description turns out to be as incomplete as my previous
understanding of Fish's work was incomplete. Theory does claim to be

what Knapp and Michaels define it as, but theory actually functions

differently. In fact, theory is a kind of practice, a peculiar kind because it
claims to escape practice. But the impossibility of achieving this goal does
10. Colin R. MacKinnon, "Talking Back: Orientalism and the Orientals," Humanities
Report 4 (Feb. 1982): 5.
11. See Said, "Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims," Social Text 1 (Winter
1979): 7-58; rev. and rpt. in Said, The Question of Palestine (New York, 1979), pp. 56-114.
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not prevent theory from continuing, nor does it negate the effects it has
as persuasion. It is telling that Knapp and Michaels do not call for the end

of critical practice even though they reject criticism's claim to find
meaning objectively in autonomous texts, intentions, or reading experiences. Michaels has pointed out correctly that such practice misconceives
its function: the meanings it claims to find are actually determined completely by the beliefs it assumes.12 Similarly, theory claims to be in a
neutral position beyond belief and turns out not to be, yet as theoretical
practice it can still affect other practices as persuasion. Theory can simply continue doing what all discursive practices do: attempt to persuade

its readers to adopt its point of view, its way of seeing texts and the
world. Whether successful persuasion takes place as a result of misun-

derstanding or not, theory can be consequential as rhetorical inducement and thus will never be abandoned (as Knapp and Michaels no

doubt realize).
In their conclusion to "Against Theory," the authors write:

The theoretical impulse, as we have described it, always in-

volves the attempt to separate things that should not be separated:
on the ontological side, meaning from intention, language from
speech acts; on the epistemological side, knowledge from true belief. Our point has been that the separated terms are in fact inseparable. It is tempting to end by saying that theory and practice

too are inseparable. But this would be a mistake. Not because

theory and practice (unlike the other terms) really are separate but
because theory is nothing else but the attempt to escape practice.
Meaning is just another name for expressed intention, knowledge
just another name for true belief, but theory is not just another

name for practice. [Pp. 741-42]

Though they deny it here, Knapp and Michaels do seem to separate
theory and practice. They could have said that "theory is just another
name for metapractice (practice about practice)." Instead they chose to
imply a distinction between two kinds of discourse that are similar in
function: theory is an instantiation of practice even as it claims to escape
from practice. Why do Knapp and Michaels ignore this? Strangely, this
implied separation of theory and practice can be seen as strengthening
rather than weakening their argument. Indeed it confirms at least part

of it. Like all theoretical discourse, "Against Theory" separates the
inseparable-theory from practice-in order to prescribe practice-the
abandonment of theory. Of course, whether Knapp and Michaels'
theory has consequences depends on whether it persuades readers to

take its amusing examples and ingenious arguments seriously. I hope I
have done so.

12. See Walter Benn Michaels, "Saving the Text: Reference and Belief," MLN

(Dec. 1978): 771-93.
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